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NOTES & COMMENTS
BAKER V. GOLD SEAL LIQUORS, INC.: RAILROAD
-REORGANIZATION AND THE AVAILABILITY OF
SETOFF UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Introduction
When a creditor of a bankrupt in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act' also owes a sum to the bankrupt, he generally is allowed
to set off his debt to the bankrupt against that which the debtor owes
him by invoking section 682 of the Act. This setoff provision3 is
founded on the traditional commercial practice of settling accounts
through the cancellation of mutual debts.' It was incorporated in the
Bankruptcy Act to preserve traditional business expectations proAct of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840, as amended, Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-496, 11 U.S.C. § §
1-1103 (1970), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (Supp. I1, 1973).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1970). Section 68 provides:

Set-offs and counterclaims.
a. In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the
estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and
one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance only shall
be allowed or paid.
b. A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any
debt or of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estate
and allowable under subdivision (g) of section 93 of this title; or (2)
was purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the petition
or within four months before such filing with a view to such use and
with knowledge or notice that such bankrupt was insolvent or had
committed an act of bankruptcy.
Id.

Setoff, as discussed in this article, refers only to setoff as provided for in section
68 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1970). It should not be confused with a
setoff which may be allowed under section 60(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §
96(c) (1970). Section 60(c) provides that if a creditor receives a voidable preference,
normally recoverable from him by a trustee of a bankrupt,
and afterward in good faith gives the debtor further credit without
security of any kind for property which becomes a part of the debtor's
estate, the amount of such new credit remaining unpaid at the time
of the adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off against the amount
which would otherwise be recoverable from him.
Id.
J. A. MAcLAcHmN, BKAKRuPTcy

§

288 (1956). See also Cumberland Glass Mfg.

Co. v. DeWitt, 237 U.S. 447 (1915), in which the Court stated that the setoff provision
was "based upon the generally recognized right of mutual debtors." Id. t 455.
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duced by reliance on the setoff practice,5 and to prevent uneconomical procedures which might have resulted from its exclusion.' Indeed,
it would seem unfair to allow a bankrupt to collect the whole amount
due from his creditor while only allowing the creditor a fractional
return on his claim . 7 Nevertheless, courts managing railroad reorganizations under section 778 of the Bankruptcy Act have been hesitant
J. A. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 288 (1956).
Id. at 338. MacLachlan writes,
If the law of liquidiation required the two sides of accounts between the parties to be broken down upon the insolvency of one party,
so that the representative of the insolvent estate could always enforce
the items in his favor in full and only pay a dividend upon the opposing items, all but the least sophisticated business men would be aware
of the fact and would conduct themselves accordingly. That would
certainly have a chilling effect on business confidence, and would
invite uneconomical paper work.
Id.
4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 68.02, at 853 (14th Ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
CoLLIER].
8 Bankruptcy Act § 77, 11 U.S.C. §205 (1970). Section 77 provides for the reorgani-

zation of a railroad through the combined efforts of a federal district court and the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Warren v. Palmer, 310 U.S. 132, 138 (1940). The
statute has two basic objectives-"the conservation of the debtor's assets for the benefit of creditors and the preservation of an ongoing railroad in the public interest." New
Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 431 (1970).
Section 77 proceedings are initiated by the filing of a voluntary petition by any
railroad corporation, or by the filing of an involuntary petition by any number of a
railroad corporation's creditors who hold at least five percent of its total indebtedness.
This petition must be filed with the district court in whose territorial jurisdiction such
corporation has had its principal operating office for the preceding six months. The
petition must state that the railroad is insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they
mature, and that it desires to effect a plan of reorganization. Once satisfied that the
above criteria have been met, and that the petition has been filed in good faith, the
district judge to whom the petition is addressed must approve it. His approval commences the proceedings and vests in the reorganization court, the court in which the
approval order is issued, exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and its property. Bankruptcy Act § 77(a), 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1970).
The remainder of section 77 provides a framework for the continued operation of
a debtor railroad and for the formulation and confirmation of a reorganization plan.
After approval of the petition, a hearing is held at which the district judge must
appoint one or more trustees of the corporation's property. The trustees are authorized
to operate the business, and may, with the approval of the judge, obtain additional
cash or property through the issuance of certificates for such cash or property. Bankruptcy Act § 77(c), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1)-(3) (1970). Proposed reorganization plans
may be filed by the debtor railroad, the trustees, creditors, or stockholders. Proposed
plans must be filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which has the duty of
reviewing and holding hearings on such plans. The ICC may reject, approve, or alter
and approve any plan. Once a plan has been approved, however, the ICC must certify
the plan to the court with a transcript of all proceedings and a copy of the report and
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to allow setoffs.1 They have pointed to the peculiar status of the
debtor railroad' ° and to the rehabilitative intent of the reorganization
proceeding,'" factors which distinguish the reorganization proceeding
from straight bankruptcy.12As a general rule, the courts have adopted
the position that setoff will not be allowed where it is inconsistent
with the purpose of section 77.11 The foremost purpose-related consideration has been the immediate cash need of the debtor,' 4 a need that
must be fulfilled if the debtor is to continue operations until a reorganization plan can be confirmed. In denying a setoff in its recent
order approving the plan. Bankruptcy Act § 77(d), 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1970). After
certification to the court, a plan must meet the criteria quoted in note 27, infra, for
confirmation. Upon final confirmation, a plan is binding on the debtor railroad, the
stockholders, and all creditors of the debtor, and the corporation designated in the plan
to carry out the provisions of such plan shall be entrusted with the power to do so. The
final transfer of all property necessary for the carrying out of the plan to the corporation
designated to fulfill that purpose marks the termination of proceedings, and the judge
is then empowered to enter an order discharging the trustees and closing the case.
Bankruptcy Act § 77(f), 11 U.S.C. § 205(f) (1970).
For a more thorough discussion of section 77 reorganization proceedings, see Haskell, Railroad Reorganizationfor Beginners, 24 ALA. L. REV. 295 (1972); Swaine, A
Decade Of RailroadReorganization Under Section 77 of the FederalBankruptcy Act,
56 IAv. L. Rav. 1037 (1943).
For a discussion of the Interstate Commerce Commission's role in reorganization,
see Craven, The Judicial and Administrative Mechanism of Section 77, 7 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 464 (1940).
See In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 339 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 477
F.2d 841 (3d Cir.), aff'd sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Trustees of Penn
Central Transp. Co., 414 U.S. 885 (1973) (summary proceeding in reorganization court
denying a number of the Penn Central's shippers the right to use various setoffs against
the railroad's trustees' claims for freight charges, and ordering certain shippers to pay
the amounts due); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. National City Bank, 315 F. Supp. 1281
(E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 520 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972) (summary proceeding in the reorganization court denying 142 banks in which the Penn
Central had deposit accounts the right to setoff the amount the railroad owed them
against the deposited funds); In re Central R.R., 273 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1967), aff'd,
392 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1968) (reorganization court proceeding denying The New York
Central Railroad Company the right to set off against The Central Railroad certain
portions of their interline freight balances).
11See Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 164 (1936),
in which the Court discusses the uncertainty of the actual financial status of the debtor
and the outcome of reorganization proceedings as considerations which discourage the
automatic application of section 68 to railroads undergoing section 77 reorganization.
This case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 48-68 infra.
See cases cited at note 9 supra.
2 Straight bankruptcy, as used in this article, refers to the liquidation of a party
and the distribution of his assets to his creditors provided for in Chapters I through
VII of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1970).
13 See cases cited at note 9 supra.
" See cases cited at note 9 supra.
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decision in Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc.,'5 however, the Supreme
Court departed significantly from this traditional rationale.
In Baker, the trustees" of the property of the Penn Central Transportation Company, a corporation in reorganization under section 77
of the Bankruptcy Act,"7 initiated an action for unpaid freight charges
against Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois."5 The defendant shipper counterclaimed for loss and damage to various shipments of merchandise
handled by the Penn Central for the defendant's account.'" On the
trustees' motion for summary judgment in favor of both their own
and Gold Seal's claims, the sole issue was whether the court should
allow the setoff of one judgment against the other."0 The trustees
contended that a setoff was contrary to the purposes of reorganization. In addition, they pointed to Orders number 1 and 571 of the
Penn Central reorganization court,' which restrained setoffs, and to
94 S.Ct. 2504 (1974).
Section 77(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1) (1970), provides
for the appointment of one or more trustees of the railroad upon approval of a petition
for reorganization under section 77; section 77(c)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(2) (1970),
outlines the duties and powers of the trustees appointed.
,1 The reorganization court for the Penn Central is the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which approved Penn Central's petition
for reorganization on June 21, 1970. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. National City Bank,
315 F. Supp. 1281, 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
Is The trustees brought this action in the Illinois district court because Gold Seal
disputed the freight claim. Appendix to Petitioner's and Respondent's Briefs at A7,
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2504 (1974). Unless the debtor of a railroad
in reorganization consents to the jurisdiction of the reorganization court, or unless
there is no claim adverse to the railroad's claim, the railroad must seek adjudication
in a plenary proceeding. In re Lehigh & Hudson River Ry., 468 F.2d 430, 433-34 (2d
Cir. 1972). See 2 COLLER 23.05, at 484-85.
,1 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that no carrier may provide services of
carriage on credit. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S.
520 (1931). The Court has, however, permitted a shipper to collect by setoff, or counterclaim, upon claims which it may have against the carrier for loss or damage when the
carrier brings suit to recover freight charges. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Lindell, 281 U.S.
14 (1930).
20 The amounts of both parties' claims were stipulated prior to the trustees' motion for summary judgment. Appendix to Petitioner's and Respondent's Briefs at AllA15, Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2504 (1974).
21 The reorganization court for the Penn Central, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, issued Order number 1 on approval of the
railroad company's petition for reorganization, June 21, 1970, Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. National City Bank, 315 F. Supp. 1281, 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1970), and Order number
571 as a result of the proceeding in In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 339 F. Supp. 603
(E.D. Pa. 1972). Order number 1 contained the following provisions:
9. All persons and all firms and corporations, whatsoever and
"
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that court's consistent refusal to apply section 68.22 Nevertheless,
finding no authority for the entry of separate judgments, the district
court allowed a net judgment for Gold Seal." The Seventh Circuit
wheresoever situated, located or domiciled, hereby are restrained and
enjoined from interfering with, seizing, converting, appropriating, attaching, garnisheeing, levying upon, or enforcing liens upon, or in any
manner whatsoever disturbing any portion of the assets, goods,
money, deposit balances, credits, choses in action, interests, railroads,
properties or premises belonging to, or in the possession of the Debtor
as owner, lessee or otherwise, or from taking possession of or from
entering upon, or in any way interfering with the same, or any part
thereof, or from interfering in any manner with the operation of said
railroads, properties or premises or the carrying on of its business by
the Debtor under the order of this Court and from commencing or
continuing any proceeding against the Debtor, whether for obtaining
or for the enforcement of any judgment or decree or for any other
purpose, provided that suits or claims for damages caused by the
operation of trains, buses, or other means of transportation may be
filed and prosecuted to judgment in any Court of competent jurisdiction, and provided, further, that the title of any owner, whether as
trustee or otherwise, to rolling stock equipment leased or conditionally
sold to the Debtor, and any right of such owner to take possession of
such property in compliance with the provisions of any such lease or
conditional sale contract, shall not be affected by the provisions of this
order.
10. All persons, firms and corporations, holding collateral heretofore pledged by the Debtor as security for its notes or obligations or
holding for the account of the Debtor deposit balances or credits be
and each of them hereby are restrained and enjoined from selling,
converting or otherwise disposing of such collateral, deposit balances
or other credits, or any part thereof, or from offsetting the same, or
any thereof, against any obligation of the debtor, until further order
of this Court.
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2504, 2510 n.4 (1974). Order number 571
reads,
AND NOW, this 31st day of January, 1972, it is Ordered that the
petition of the Trustees for an order directing shippers to pay amounts
due Debtor (Document No. 400) is GRANTED IN PART, and all
persons, firms and corporations served with a copy of said petition are
enjoined, until further order of this Court, from setting off or attempting to set-off against obligations due and owing to the Debtor on
account of charges for services of carriage any claim or claims which
they may have against the Debtor, arising prior to June 21, 1970, but
any such claim or claims may be filed and proved in accordance with
Order No. 164 in this proceeding. This Order shall be deemed to be
without prejudice to the right of any such shipper to claim such priority as may be proper.
Brief for Respondent at la, Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2504 (1974).
12See In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 339 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. National City Bank, 315 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
2 The decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, delivered
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similarly disposed of the trustees' contentions on appeal. 4 Stating
that it was the trustees who had invoked the jurisdiction of the district court, the court of appeals found "nothing in the principles of
'judicial comity' to require the Illinois court to withhold the full exercise" of that jurisdiction.2 5
The setoff issue was presented to the Supreme Court on writ of
certiorari. 6 In reversing the decision below, the Court gave little attention to the reorganization court's Orders or to the traditional consideration of a reorganization debtor's need for operating capital.
Instead, it focused on the plan of reorganization to be formulated for
the rehabilitation of the debtor. The Court emphasized the "fair and
equitable" requirement27 imposed on section 77 plans. This requirement, which originated in early equity receivership reorganization
cases, mandates the full satisfaction of a higher priority creditor's
claim before a lower priority creditor is allowed any recovery on his
claim under the reorganization plan.28 Noting that the allowance of
a setoff constitutes a form of priority which must be consistent with
this absolute priority requirement, the Court struck down the district
court's setoff as a discriminatory preference in favor of Gold Seal over
the Penn Central's other creditors. The Court, however, did not confine itself to a decision on the issue presented. Characterizing reorgon March 16, 1972, is unreported. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., No. 70 C 3205 (N.D.
Ill., March 16, 1972).
24 484 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1973).
21 Id. at 951.
21 Certiorari was granted at 414 U.S. 1156 (1974).
27 Section 77(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970), states, in
pertinent part, that the reorganization court shall approve a plan if it is
...fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of each
class of creditors and stockholders, does not discriminate unfairly in
favor of any class of creditors or stockholders, and will conform to the
requirements of the law of the land regarding the participation of the
various classes of creditors and stockholders...
Id.
The Supreme Court established the conjunction between principles of fairness
and equity and the absolute priority rule in an equity receivership case. Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504 (1913). The absolute priority rule has been extended to
railroad reorganization by the "fair and equitable" requirement of section 77(e). Group
of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 541-42
(1943). See Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 477-83 (1943). In a reorganization
case involving a recapitalization, the Surpeme Court outlined the rule as follows:
The important element is the allocation of the securities so as to
preserve to creditors the advantage of their respective priorities. That
is to say, senior claims first receive securities of a worth sufficient to
cover their face and interest before junior claims receive anything.
Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 483 (1943).
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anization setoffs as preferences contrary to the "fair and equitable"
policy of section 77, the Court also stated that as a general rule
29
section 77 courts should not allow setoffs.
A Closer Look at the Rationale: Inconsistency and the Lowden
Precedent
The initially striking feature of the Court's opinion in Baker is the
apparent limitation of the general rule which proscribes section 77
reorganization courts from permitting setoffs 0 This limitation seems
inappropriate since the issue in Baker was not the propriety of a
section 77 court's setoff, but that of a non-reorganization court. The
anomaly may be avoided, however, by reading the proscription as
applying to all courts entertaining a suit to which a section 77 debtor
is a party. The Court must have intended such a reading since the
rationale underlying the general rule was utilized to reverse the decision of a non-reorganization court.3 ' Further, the Court's rule cannot
be understood as authorizing a reorganization court to split a net
judgment entered in a plenary proceeding when it is presented to the
reorganization court as a liquidated claim. Splitting would require
the partition of a net judgment into two distinct judgments, one for
the debtor railroad and one for the creditor, in order to circumvent
the setoff effect. The alteration of net judgments in this manner
would controvert the general prohibition against collateral attacks.2
In the instant case, there was apparently no question of the Illinois
- 94 S.Ct. 2504, 2509 (1974). Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Justice Powell
joined, concurred in the majority result, but argued against the general rule and in
favor of denying the setoff on the basis of the reorganization court's orders. 94 S.Ct.
at 2509-10. Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that section 77(1) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(1) (1970), unconditionally mandates the application
of section 68 in railroad reorganization. 94 S.Ct. at 2511. For the text and a discussion
of section 77(1), see notes 76-77 and accompanying text infra. He also argued in the
alternative that the Illinois district court had discretion whether to permit setoff, and
that the trustees had failed to show that allowance of the setoff "would be inconsistent
with [the] higher priorities of reorganization." 94 S.Ct. at 2512-13.
3 The majority's concluding sentence reads as follows: "As a general rule of administration for § 77 Reorganization Courts, the setoff should not be allowed." 94 S.Ct.
at 2509.
11See the discussion of the history of the case in the text accompanying notes 2528 supra.
2 "Full faith and credit" requires that a reorganization court give conclusive
effect to a judgment rendered in another court which had jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter. Alteration or modification of such a judgment must occur
through standard appellate procedures. Any deviation from this practice would constitute a violation of historical precedent as well as the policy behind full faith and credit.
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district court's power to adjudicate both claims.3 The general rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court, then, must apply to all courts
which confront the issue of setoff in a suit to which a section 77 debtor
is a party. This appears to be the understanding of Justice Stewart,
who discussed the announced doctrine in his concurring opinion as if
it were to be applied in all setoff cases to which a section 77 debtor
34
is a party.
Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Justice Powell joined, would
have denied the setoff on the alternative ground that the reorganization court's orders enjoined such action. His concurrence was founded
on the reorganization court's "'exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor
and its property wherever located.' ,,35 Mr. Justice Stewart admitted
that this did not give the reorganization court power to enforce the
cause of action, 36 but he argued that it did "empower the court to
protect the 'property' and to immunize it from diminution through
setoff or counterclaim. ' 37 It should be noted that although a reorganization court may have the power to enjoin setoffs within the jurisdiction of other courts, 3s such action apparently was not taken in the
Penn Central proceedings. Both Order number 1 and Order number
571 were directed against non-judicial setoffs.3 In addition, Order 571
1 The trustees initiated the action in a court possessing jurisdiction over Gold
Seal, and the action of the Supreme Court made clear that the Illinois district court
also had jurisdiction to entertain the cournterclaim. 94 S.Ct. at 2506.
m See Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in which he commented that the majority's new rule, directly applicable to section 77 debtors, apparently will be applied
in all cases involving judicial setoffs to which such debtors are parties. 94 S.Ct. at 250910.
94 S.Ct. at 2510, citing Bankruptcy Act § 77(a), 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1970)
(emphasis deleted).
"' As discussed in note 18, supra, a summary proceeding in the reorganization
court cannot be utilized for adjudication of the claim of the trustees when it is adversely contested and when the defendant does not consent to the court's jurisdiction.
See note 18 supra; In re Roman, 23 F.2d 556, 558 (2d Cir. 1928) (L. Hand, J.).
s 94 S.Ct. at 2510.
The majority in Baker cited a federal case from Michigan, Baker v. Southeastern Mich. Shippers Co-operative Ass'n, 376 F. Supp. 148, 156 (E.D. Mich.1973), which
held that the Penn Central reorganization court's Orders prevented other courts from
allowing setoffs. 94 S.Ct. at 2508 n.10. Although the majority did not accept the
reasoning of this case as exemplified in the Stewart-Powell contention, their apparent
rejection of it was based on the content of the Orders and not on the inability of a
reorganization court to take such action. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
Thus the lower court decision and the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart may
provide authority for section 77 courts to enjoin setoffs by other courts in future reorganization proceedings.
3' Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Order number 1 and Order number 571 specifically
restrained the creditors of the Penn Central from effecting setoffs. No mention was
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applied only to those persons, firms, and corporations actually served
with a copy of the petition in In re Penn Central TransportationCo.,"0
a summary proceeding in the reorganization court which precluded
the setoff of damage claims for most of the Penn Central's creditors.
Gold Seal was neither served with nor named in the petition initiating that action.4' Thus, it appears that although the concurring Justices may have been correct with respect to a reorganization court's
general power to enjoin setoffs, they overlooked the actual content of
the orders issued in the proceedings prior to Baker.
Concluding that the contention of Justices Stewart and Powell
was not applicable to the instant case, the majority instead reversed
on the ground that the setoff constituted a preference which contravened the absolute priority rule imposed on railroad reorganization
plans by the "fair and equitable" language of section 77(e). In initiating their analysis by examining the interrelation between absolute
priority and the fair and equitable criteria, the Justices utilized well
established principles. The absolute priority rule has long been held
to be incorporated in the fair and equitable requirement,"2 and the
Supreme Court has carefully outlined the rule as it applies to section
77.43 The application of the rule to setoff, however, comprehends an
unprecedented leap from particular to pervasive coverage.44
Before the Court's decision in Baker, apparently no court had
considered setoff as a form of priority which must yield to the absolute priority requirement. The courts' reluctance to take this step
emanates from the language of secton 77. Setoff must necessarily
occur before a reorganization plan can be confirmed, yet the fair and
equitable requirement applies only to the plan. 5 There is no indication in section 77 that the fair and equitable criteria was intended to
relate the protection of the absolute priority rule back to the approval
made of judicial setoffs effected by courts in plenary proceedings. For the text of Orders
1 and 571, see note 21 supra.
" 339 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See note 21 supra.
" Brief for Respondent at 11, Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2504
(1974).
1 Group of Investors v. Chicago, M., St.P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 541-42
(1943). See Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 477-83 (1943).
10See quote from Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 483 (1943), at note
28 supra.
" Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Baker, apparently no court had attempted to relate the absolute priority requirement, placed solely on the reorganization
plan, back to the filing of the petition for reorganization, thus enabling the rule to be
applied to setoff.
' See text of Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970), included in note
27 supra.
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of the petition for reorganization. Nevertheless, the majority utilized
the fair and equitable criteria by classifying the entire reorganization
procedure as "architectural."4 Assuming that this conceptualization
of reorganization and its subsequent extension of the absolute priority
rule throughout the reorganization process is justified, there would
appear to be no difficulty with the concluding rationale that the
preference inherent in setoff is inconsistent with the fair and' equitable policy of section 77. However, in utilizing the rule as the foundation for the application of the inconsistency rationale, the majority
appears to have overlooked what has formerly been considered a necessary ingredient for the application of that rationale to setoff.
Prior to Baker, the utilization of the inconsistency rationale as a
basis for denying the application of section 68 to a railroad debtor
required that the setoff be inconsistent with an aspect or purpose of
reorganization that was different from any aspect or purpose of
straight bankruptcy.47 This condition was established as a necessary
part of the inconsistency rationale following the Supreme Court's
decision in Lowden v. NorthwesternNationalBank & Trust Co. 48 In
Lowden, the Court considered whether section 68 of the Bankruptcy
Act applied to reorganization proceedings under section 77 of the
Act.49 Although the case was dismissed on the ground that the questions presented were improperly drawn,5" the Court nevertheless established the following rule for the application of section 68 to railroad debtors:5
[Section 68] governs, if at all, by indirection and analogy
according to the circumstances. The rule to be accepted...
is that enforced by courts of equity, which differs from the rule
in bankruptcy chiefly in its greater flexibility, the rule in bankruptcy being framed in adaptation to standardized conditions,
and that in equity varying with the needs of the occasion,
94 S.Ct. at 2508.
7 See Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936);
Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 84 F.2d 847 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 583 (1936) (remand of principal case); and cases cited at note 9 supra.
' 298 U. S. 160 (1936).
s' The issue was brought before the Court on certificate from the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 161.
" The Court dismissed the certificate on the grounds that its questions were
"unnecessarily general" and admitted of "one answer in one set of circumstances and
a different answer in another, the differentiating circumstances being imperfectly disclosed." Id. at 166.
51 Though dictum, the Court's reasoning in Lowden concerning the availability of
setoffs against section 77 debtors has been viewed as authoritative. Baker v. Gold Seal
Liquors, Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2504, 2509 n.2 (1974). See, e.g., cases cited at note 9 supra.
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though remaining constant, like the statute, in the absence of
deflecting force.52
The pronouncement of this rule was significant not only as a
guideline for lower courts, but also in its predication on the differences between straight bankruptcy and reorganization. Before stating
the rule, the Lowden Court specifically noted that reorganization
differed from the liquidation and distribution of assets contemplated
in straight bankruptcy.53 The Court stated that section 68 was intended to apply to straight bankruptcy, and added that the uncertainty of the outcome of reorganization and the final status of the
debtor would discourage the automatic application of the setoff provision to section 77.1 The Court also noted that reorganization required that the trustees possess "the power to gather in the assets and
keep the business going,"55 a necessity if the rehabilitative intent of
section 77 was to be realized.
The discussion in Lowden of the differences between the two
forms of bankruptcy proceedings provides insight into the meaning
of "deflecting forces" in the rule established by the Court governing
the application of section 68 to railroad reorganization.58 Apparently,
the Lowden Court considered that a denial of the application of section 68 to a railroad debtor should be premised upon various aspects
of section 77 which were not present in straight bankruptcy. In other
words, where the differences between the status of an ordinary bankrupt and that of a debtor railroad, or those between the goals of
straight bankruptcy and reorganization, were such that the application of section 68 would be inequitable, setoff should be denied. The
rationale behind the Court's attention to these differences is clear.
Unless a setoff would interfere with some aspect peculiar to section
77, a denial of the application of section 68 to a railroad debtor, when
applicable to a bankrupt, would be contrary to the express provision
for setoff in the Bankruptcy Act. In later decisions, although substituting the inconsistency rationale for the testing of equities suggested in Lowden, courts have adhered to the reasoning on which the
Lowden rule was predicated. 7 Not surprisingly, the tests developed
as the bases for the application of the inconsistency rationale origi52 298

U.S. 160, 164-65 (1936).

Id. at 163.
s Id. at 163-64.

Id. at 164.
See text accompanying note 52 supra.
"See, e.g., Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 84 F.2d 847 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 583 (1936), and cases cited at note 9 supra.
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nated from the Lowden Court's suggestion of two factors which represented differences sufficient to constitute "deflecting forces."
As criteria for testing the equities of setoff, the Lowden Court had
suggested the uncertain status of railroads in reorganization proceedings and the necessity that a section 77 debtor be able to acquire
operating capital. 8 The former consideration was immediately utilized on remand of the Lowden case to the Eighth Circuit. 9 In denying the bank's setoff of railroad bonds against the railroad's deposit
account, the court of appeals held that it would be inconsistent with
section 77 to allow setoff unless it appeared that "insolvency actually
existed and that liquidation and distribution of assets, rather than
reorganization and rehabilitation, was in order."" The indication was
that the uncertain future of a railroad in reorganization operated
universally to exclude setoffs until it could be shown that straight
bankruptcy proceedings were in order." In this context, the Eighth
Circuit's insolvency test was seemingly consistent with the first
Lowden consideration."2 The courts, however, have shown a general
reluctance to rely on it.13 Although no reason has been advanced for
this rejection, it apparently is due to the absolute result the test
would have produced. Utilization of the insolvency test in any case
would preclude setoff against a section 77 debtor as long as the railroad was considered reorganizable. Since section 77 is permeated
with a strong public interest in continued transportation services,"
298 U.S. 160, 163-65 (1936).
Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 84 F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1936).
Id. at 855. "Insolvency," as referred to in this article, has the same meaning as
in the Bankruptcy Act, § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970).
A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this
title whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property
which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or
permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder,
or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in
amount to pay his debts.
"

Id.

61Prior to stating its insolvency test, the appellate court quoted extensively from
the Supreme Court's decision in Lowden. 84 F.2d 847, 854-55 (8th Cir. 1936). The test
was obviously drawn from the Supreme Court's language concerning the difference in
status between a railroad in reorganization and that of a bankrupt. The former is
uncertain due to the indefinite outcome of reorganization while the latter, by definition, is certain to be liquidated.
62 See note 61 supra.

See cases cited at note 9 supra.
The consideration of the public interest in section 77 reorganizations has been
called an "absolute necessity." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. National City Bank, 315
F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The Supreme Court has focused on the mandatory
64
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an interest which all but precludes courts from choosing to liquidate
railroad debtors, 5 the test would extend protection even to those
section 77 debtors who might be more suitable for straight bankruptcy. Such a result would be contrary to the generally permissive
tone of the Lowden decision,8" and to the Supreme Court's holding
that each case be determined on its particular facts.67
As a substitute for the insolvency test and the uncertainty consideration on which it was founded, courts have relied on the second
consideration suggested in the Lowden decision: the debtor railroad's
need for operating capital." The utilization, of this consideration in
adjudicating the issue of setoff is consistent with both the rehabilitative intent of section 77 and the public interest in railroad survival.
If a railroad is to continue to meet the public demand for transportation services while undergoing reorganization, as well as to emerge
from reorganization with favorable prospects for the future, it is imperative that its operating capital not be severly diminished by setoff.
Specific examples of this reasoning occurred in In re CentralRailroad
7
Co." and Penn Central TransportationCo. v. National City Bank. 1
In CentralRailroad, the district court initiated its discussion by
reciting the traditional foundation for the utilization of the inconsistency rationale, the differences between straight bankruptcy and railroad reorganization. It noted that these distinctions must not be disconsideration of maintaining transportation services in New Haven Inclusion Cases,
399 U.S. 392, 420 (1970); Penn Central Merger and Norfolk &Western Inclusion Cases,
389 U.S. 486, 511 (1968); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328
U.S. 495, 535-36 (1946).
"3Liquidation would most likely involve abandonment of a number of railroad
lines being operated during reorganization. Thus, approval of straight bankruptcy for
a railroad would be inconsistent with the public interest in continued transportation
services. This -interest is further secured by the prevention of abandonment of any line
without the permission of the ICC or the appropriate state regulatory agency. Bankruptcy Act § 77(o), 11 U.S.C. § 205(o) (1970).
66 The Supreme Court in Lowden called for "weighing the competing equities of
the interested factions" in determining whether setoff should be allowed. 298 U.S. at
165-66. The Court then concluded by stating: "When all the facts are known, they may
be found to offer no excuse for a departure from the rule in bankruptcy which, as
indicated already, is generally, even if not always, the rule in equity as well." Id. at
166.
7The weighing of the equities contemplated by the Court in Lowden requires that
each case, with its various equity interests, be decided on its own fact. See note 66
supra.
" See cases cited at note 9 supra.
6 273 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1967), aff'd, 392 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1968).
7o315 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D.Pa. 1970), aff'd 453 F.2d 520 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 923 (1972).
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regarded, 7' and specifically pointed to the difference in purpose, that
of bankruptcy being liquidation, and that of reorganization "to save
a sick business. 712 In conclusion, the court held that a setoff of interline freight balances would not be consistent with the rehabilitative
purpose of section 77. The basis for denying the setoff under the
inconsistency rationale was the court's finding that setoffs of the
nature attempted in the case "would deprive the Debtor of revenue
at a time when such revenue is sorely needed,"
thus jeopardizing the
73
chances of a successful reorganization.
The same line of reasoning was followed in the National City Bank
case in which 142 banks had attempted to setoff the Penn Central's
debts owing them by applying the railroad's deposit accounts to the
amounts owed. The Third Circuit denied the setoffs on the ground
that they were inconsistent with the rehabilitative purpose of reorganization. As in Central Railroad,the basis for the court's finding of
inconsistency in National City Bank was its conclusion that the setoffs would severely diminish the railroad's operating capital, and
74
would thus frustrate the railroad's chances for continued operation.
These decisions reveal the full maturation of the inconsistency
rationale as founded on the cash need test. In sum, they indicate that
in any case in which a setoff might diminish the debtor railroad's
operating capital to the extent of threatening the continuation of
transportation services and the eventual success of reorganization,
the application of section 68 will be denied as inconsistent with the
rehabilitative purpose of section 77. In relying on the rehabilitative
purpose, the courts adhered to the traditional foundation for the
utilization of the inconsistency rationale to deny a setoff, the requirement that only factors of section 77 which are different from straight
bankruptcy can serve as a basis for a finding of inconsistency. The
courts' adherence to this precedent reveals their continual attention
to the reasoning in which the Lowden rule was predicated, that it
would be contrary to the express provision for setoff in the Bankruptcy Act to deny the application of section 68 to a railroad debtor
unless setoff would interfere with a particular aspect of section 77
which was not present in straight bankruptcy. It remains to be considered whether the Supreme Court, in utilizing the absolute priority
rule as the basis for the finding of inconsistency in Baker, gave ade1'In

re Central R.R., 273 F. Supp. 282, 287 (D.N.J. 1967).

72 Id.

at 288.

73 Id.

",Penn Central Transp. Co. v. National City Bank, 453 F.2d 520, 523 (3d Cir.
1972), affd, 315 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

19751

RAILROAD REORGANIZATION

quate attention to the different factor precedent and the rationale on
which it was based.
A close examination of Baker discloses the reason for the majority's departure from the traditional cash need test as the basis for the
inconsistency rationale. That test would only support a finding of
inconsistency where the application of section 68 might diminish the
railroad debtor's operating capital, thus threatening its opportunity
for eventual survival. The amount sought to be setoff in Baker was
only $6,999.76.7 Difficult sidestepping would have been necessary for
the Court to justify a denial of a setoff for such an amount on the
basis that the setoff would deplete the debtor's operating capital to
the point where it might frustrate the rehabilitative purpose of section 77. Under few circumstances could a setoff of this size be considered to interfere greatly with that purpose. Recognizing this difficulty, the majority invoked the absolute priority rule as the basis for
its decision.
On its face, the majority's utilization of the absolute priority rule
appears consistent with the statutory pronouncement of the inconsistency rationale. Section 77(1)76 of the Bankruptcy Act merely requires
that a right secured under straight bankruptcy be inconsistent with
a provision of section 77 in order for that right to be denied. The
precedent indicating that inconsistency must be founded on a factor
peculiar to section 77, however, has been adopted as part of section
77(1) .7 The Baker majority, although utilizing a particular provision
7, This was the amount of the stipulated claim of the trustees for the freight
charges. In entering the net judgment in favor of Gold Seal, the district court merely
subtracted the $6,999.76 from Gold Seal's claim of $18,016.77, thus arriving at the net
figure of $11,017.01. Appendix to Petitioner's and Respondent's Briefs at A37, Baker
v. Gold Seal Liquors, 94 S.Ct. 2504 (1974).
Bankruptcy Act § 77(1), 11 U.S.C. 205(1) (1970), provides as follows:

In proceedings under this section and consistent with the provisions thereof, the jurisdiction and powers of the court, the duties of
the debtor and the rights and liabilities of creditors, and of all persons
with respect to the debtor and its property, shall be the same as if a
voluntary petition for adjudication has been filed and a decree of
adjudication has been entered on the day when the debtor's petition
was filed.
Id.
In adjudicating the issue of setoff against a section 77 debtor, apparently no
court mentioning section 77(1) has utilized an aspect or purpose not peculiar to section
77 as the basis for denying a setoff under the inconsistency rationale. The predecessor
to section 77(1) was specifically referred to in Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 84 F.2d 847 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 583 (1936). Other courts, see

cases cited at note 9, supra, have not discussed section 77(1), but in utilizing the
inconsistency rationale to deny setoffs, have adhered to the different factor precedent.
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of section 77 to reverse the district court's setoff, did not discuss this
precedent. It might be suggested, however, that they intended adherence to the different factor precedent to be understood from their
direct reference to the fair and equitable language of section 77, language not present in the straight bankruptcy provisions. Indeed, it
might be contended that because the order of priority established by
this language is different from that in straight bankruptcy, the utilization of the absolute priority rule as the foundation for the inconsistency rationale is consistent with the precedent." But this reasonsing
is unpersuasive.
Straight bankruptcy also comprehends the payment of the claims
of creditors according to an order of priorities, 79 and although the
order may differ from that of section 77, the underlying purpose for
the establishment of the priority requirements in both forms of bankruptcy proceedings is identical. The priority rules were enacted and
are maintained to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of creditors.8 The rules embody equitable considerations which are applicable to both railroad reorganization and straight bankruptcy. The differences in priority between both forms of bankruptcy proceedings do
not alter the purpose served by their respective priority requirements.
In essence, then, no substantial difference between straight bankruptcy and section 77 can be discerned from their dissimilar rules of
priority. The majority's utilization of the absolute priority rule as the
basis for the application of the inconsistency rationale thus reveals
an apparent disregard for the different factor precedent and the ra11The order of compensation required by the absolute priority rule has been
described as follows:
Beginning with the topmost class of claims against the debtor, each
class in descending rank must receive full and complete compensation
for the rights surrendered before the next class below may properly
participate. Thus the principle is applied as between senior and junior
secured creditors, between secured creditors and unsecured creditors,
between unsecured creditors and stockholders, between different
classes of stockholders, and, of course, between secured creditors as a
whole and stockholders.
6A COLLIER 11.06, at 613-17 (footnotes omitted).
The order of compensation required by the priority rule of straight bankruptcy is
outlined in Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
79 Id.

The language of section 77(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(e), conveys the purpose underlying the absolute priority rule in railroad reorganization. See
text of section 77(e) at note 27 supra.
The Supreme Court has expressed the purpose of the priority rules for straight
bankruptcy. See United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959); Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
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tionale on which it was based. Indeed, the denial of the district
court's setoff on the ground that it interferes with a particular aspect
of section 77 which is also present in straight bankruptcy seems contrary to the express provision for setoff in the Bankruptcy Act. This
contrary effect points to a second problem with the Baker decision.
Although certain provisions of straight bankruptcy require that a
bankrupt's creditors be paid according to a particular order of priority, section 68 is still applied in these proceedings. Where it is applied, there can be little doubt that to some extent lower priority
creditors receive a preference over those who would normally receive
before them. The courts, however, faced with the express provision
for setoff in section 68, have seen fit to endorse this preference. 8' They
have noted that the setoff provision is based on the principle that "in
the case of mutual debts, it is only the balance which is the real and
just sum owing by or to the bankrupt."82 Indeed, the courts have held
that the enactment of section 68 approves a preference which recognizes this-principle:
Without such enactment, it could be argued that any attempt to offset mutual debts or credits between the estate and
a creditor would amount to a preference under § 60 and would,
therefore, be invalid. But the Act, instead, has recognized the
possible injustice which would thus result and which would, for
example, compel a creditor to prove his claim in full and accept possible dividends thereon and at the same time pay in
full his indebtedness to the estate."
In light of the express provision for setoff in the Bankruptcy Act,
authorizing the approval of the setoff preference despite the order of
priority in straight bankruptcy, the Baker majority's utilization of
the priority rule of section 77 to reach the opposite result appears
unwarranted. The rationale behind the application of section 68
maintains that it is more equitable to fulfill the expectations of mutual debtors 4 and to prevent the injustice of allowing a bankrupt to
collect the whole amount due from his creditor while only giving the
creditor a factional return on his claim." These equitable considerations override the policy of fair participation for creditors guaranteed
by the priority rules of straight bankruptcy. There seems to be no
See 4 CoLLI
68.02, at 853 and cases cited therein.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Nelson, 101 F.2d 441, 443 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 583 (1939).
0 4 CoLumR 68.02, at 853 (footnotes omitted).
',
AZ

" J.A. MAcLAcHLAN, BANKRUprcY § 288, at 338 (1956).

u See 4 Couama

68.02, at 853 and cases cited therein.
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essential difference between the absolute priority rule of section 77
and the priority order of straight bankruptcy, both based on the
protection of fair participation, to justify a denial of these equities in
railroad reorganization. The majority's reliance on that rule as the
basis for denying the setoff under the inconsistency rationale thus not
only reveals an insensitivity to the different factor precedent, but also
creates a conflict between straight bankruptcy and reorganization
under section 77.6
The Implications of the Rule
After denying the setoff in Baker as a preference inconsistent with
the fair and equitable policy of section 77, the majority characterized
most reorganization setoffs as preferences, and established the general rule that such setoffs should not be allowed against railroad
debtors. Regardless of whether the rationale utilized by the majority
is considered improvident, the rule promulgated on the basis of this
reasoning probably will be applied by courts confronted with the
issue of setoff against a section 77 debtor. In this context, further
investigation must be made into the effect of the rule and the probable extent of its application.
In establishing its general rule the Supreme Court alluded to
"exceptional circumstances" which in equity might justify the discriminatory preference granted by setoff,87 yet the majority provided
no guidelines as to the nature of these circumstances. Until further
litigation, a situation wherein setoff might be allowed under the exceptional circumstances language can only be a matter of conjecture.
On its face, however, the rule seems to indicate that the application
of section 68 to a debtor railroad will be totally precluded.
The rule contemplates that all creditors, even those within the
priority class of the party seeking setoff, must be considered in order
to determine whether a setoff will grant a preference in contravention
of the absolute priority requirement. If a reorganization plan provided for recapitalization, and a determination was made that a certain class of creditors would not be allowed to participate in the
issuance of new securities, 5 a setoff secured by a creditor of this class
11The essence of the conflict lies in the application of section 68 to straight
bankruptcy proceedings, even where it contravenes the order of priority, as opposed
to the denial of its application in section 77 on the ground that it violates the absolute
priority rule.
3 94 S.Ct. at 2509 n.13.
A reorganization plan providing for recapitalization requires a determination of
the amount of securities to be issued according to a valuation of the debtor's earning
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would certainly constitute a discriminatory preference. It appears,
then, that the general rule will only allow the application of section
68 when setoff is sought by a member of any class of creditors who
are going to be fully compensated under the reorganization plan. This
understanding suggests the conclusion that setoff will be totally precluded in section 77. The application of section 68 would be of little
value to a creditor receiving full compensation under a reorganization
plan. In addition, the equitable rationale underlying the setoff provision89 would not be applicable to such a creditor, and it is doubtful
that a court would jeopardize a railroad's chances of rehabilitation
by granting a setoff to a creditor merely because he desired to be
compensated under section 68 rather than under a reorganization
plan. Since the application of section 68 is of no value to a creditor
receiving a full return on his claim, and cannot be secured by a
creditor who stands to gain more than he would under the plan, the
Court's general rule must be viewed as absolute. °
Nor does it appear that this rule will be limited solely to section
77. The rule's genesis may cause its extension into reorganization
proceedings under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Like section
power. 5 COLLIER 77.18, at 550 and cases cited therein. If this amount proves insufficient to compensate all creditors, the securities will be allocated first to the top priority
creditors and then in descending order to those of lower priority. Thus, certain classes
of creditors may be totally excluded from participation'in the reorganization plan.
" See text accompanying note 7 supra.
" The absolute effect suggests questions regarding the Baker decision's consistency with another proposition advanced by the Lowden Court, that adjudication of the
issue of the application of section 68 to railroad debtors would be on a case-by-case
basis. See note 67 and accompanying text supra. Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out the
majority's apparent inconsistency with the Lowden decision in this respect. 94 S.Ct.
at 2509 n.2. In response, the majority raised the exceptional circumstances consideration; however, there appears to be no situation in which such a consideration would
operate. It might be concluded, then, that the Supreme Court has now seen fit to draw
a general rule, an act the Lowden Court felt was unwise: "What we disclaim at the
moment is a willingness to put the law into a strait-jacket by subjecting it to a pronouncement of needless generality." 298 U.S. at 166. In light of the majority's insensitivity to the different factor precedent, thus creating the conflict between section 77 and
straight bankruptcy, the wisdom of providing the general rule on the absolute priority
foundation is subject to serious question.
11Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970). Chapter X was enacted in 1938 as a replacement for section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 7,
1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 49 Stat. 912. For an extensive discussion of section 77B, see
Comment, Developments in the Law, Reorganization Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act 1934-1936, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1111 (1936). For a general analysis, see
Friendly, Some Comments on the CorporateReorganizationsAct, 48 HARv. L. Rxv. 39
(1934). The procedures of Chapter X, though more detailed, are similar to those of
section 77 which are outlined at note 8 supra. One major exception is the substitution
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77, Chapter X requires that the reorganization plan be "fair and
equitable." 9 Chapter X also provides for the exclusion of rights secured under Chapters I through VII of the Bankruptcy Act when
those rights are inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter X.11 Due
to the simultaneous development of section 77 and section 77B, the
predecessor of Chapter X, the utilization of precedent under one as
controlling under the other has-been common practice." Assuming a
continuation of this practice, there is no reason why the fair and
equitable criteria of Chapter X will not be utilized to deny setoffs
against debtors in Chapter X reorganizations under the Baker rationale. As in the early railroad reorganization cases, the absolute priority
rule has been assimilated with the fair and equitable requirement in
corporate reorganizations." It also has been held to apply specifically
to Chapter X's requirement that reorganization plans be fair and
equitable. 6 Thus, a trustee of a corporation in reorganization under
of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the role of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. For discussion of the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
Chaper X reorganization, see Frank, EpitheticalJurisprudenceand The Work of the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the Administrationof ChapterX of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 317 (1941). For discussion of the major features and
the operation of Chapter X, see Billyou, A Decade of CorporateReorganizationUnder
Chapter X, 49 CoLum. L. Rav. 456 (1949); Doub, CorporateReorganizations Under
ChapterX of the NationalBankruptcyAct, 3 MD. L. Rav. 1 (1938); Gerdes, Corporate
Reorganizations: Changes Effected by ChapterX of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 HARv. L.
Rav. 1 (1938); Heebe, CorporateReorganizationUnder ChapterX of the Bankruptcy
Act, 16 LoYoLA L. Rav. 27 (1970).
92 Bankruptcy Act § 221, 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
,3 Bankruptcy Act § 102, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
" Bankruptcy Act § 77, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970) was enacted in 1933. Act of March
3, 1933, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474, ch. 204. Chapter X was originally enacted as § 77B in 1934.
Act of June 7, 1934, 48 Stat. 911, ch. 424. A particular example to the interchangeable
precedent practice is shown in the courts' adoption of the different factor precedent
established in Lowden as controlling in setoff cases involving Chapter X debtors. The
two most frequently cited cases on the allowance of setoff against Chapter X debtors,
Susquehanna Chem. Corp. v. Producers Bank & Trust Co., 174 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1949),
and In re American Coils Co., 74 F. Supp. 723 (D.N.J. 1947), include direct reference
to Lowden. In addition, the rationale utilized to deny setoff in both cases, that it would
impede the rehabilitative purpose of Chapter X, is derived from Lowden. The foundation for that rationale was the cash need test used by railroad reorganization courts in
the decisions cited at note 9 supra. Both Susquehanna and American Coils preceded
those cases in their adoption of this test. Susquehanna Chem. Corp. v. Producers Bank
and Trust Co., 174 F.2d 783, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1949); In re American Coils Co., 74 F.
Supp. 723, 725-26 (D.N.J. 1947).
11Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
" Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 86
(1942).
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Chaper X, utilizing the Baker precedent, need only show that a setoff
will create a discriminatory preference contravening Chapter X's absolute priority requirement in order to secure a denial of that setoff.
A court's recognition that most setoffs will contravene the absolute
priority rule can only lead to the establishment of a general rule
preventing the application of section 68 to Chapter X debtors.
Only one distinction may be drawn between the probable effect
of the general rule in section 77 proceedings and its effect in reorganizations under Chapter X. Except where a corporation in a Chapter
X proceeding serves a dominant public interest, the equitable consideration attached to this interest in railroad reorganizations will be
excluded. Although the formulation of the Baker rule was not dependent on the existence of this interest, the future application of the
rule in section 77 will protect the public." The exclusion of the public
interest as an equitable consideration in Chapter X, may thus aid a
creditor in establishing an exceptional circumstance. Until the courts
offer some guidelines as to what constitutes an exceptional circumstance, however, it should be concluded that the rule in Baker will
apply with equal force to Chapter X reorganizations.
It should be noted, however, that the general rule promulgated in
Baker may be obviated by the passage of the Proposed Bankruptcy
Act of 1973.11 The Proposed Act was submitted to Congress in July
of 1973 by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States. It contains provision for new chapters governing railroad and
corporate reorganizations. One significant change in the proposed
laws is the addition of a provision dealing with reorganization setoffs.
97

The exclusion of setoffs protects against diminution of the debtor's operating

capital, thus aiding the trustees in their effort to continue providing transportation

services.
IsThe Proposed Act was drafted by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States and filed with the Commission's Notes as the REPORT OF THE CoMMisSION ON THE BANKRupTcy LAws OF THE UNrrTD STATES (pts. I & HI)
on July 30, 1973. The

Commission's proposals have been introduced in the Senate and the House. See Bankruptcy Act of 1973, S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). The Proposed Act and Notes on each section are contained in II REPORT
OF =H COMMISSION ON THE BANKuircy LAws OF Tm UJN

STATES. Hearings were held
before the House Committee on the Judiciary on December 10, 1973. See 2 CCH
CONGRESSIONAL INDEX 5093 (1973-74). The Proposed Act is still under consideration by

that Committee.
For discussion of reorganization proceedings under the Proposed Act, see Trost,
Corporate Reorganization Under Chapter VII of the "Bankruptcy Act of 1973": Another View, 48 AM. BANK. L.J. 111 (1974); Weintraub and Levin, ChapterVII (Reorganizations)As ProposedBy the Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between
Theory and Reality, 47 AM BANK. L.J. 323 (1973).
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Section 7-204 of the Proposed Act provides for an automatic stay of
all setoffs against reorganization debtors upon the filing of a petition
for reorganization. 9 If this provision is passed in current proposed
form, the preclusion of setoffs now guaranteed by the Baker rule will
be procured under bankruptcy legislation. 00 If section 7-204 is omitted, however, it appears that the Baker rule will extend into reorganization proceedings under the Proposed Act.
In drafting the Proposed Act, the Commission suggested a substantial modification of the fair.and equitable requirement for reorganization plans. It appears, however, that this modification will not
affect the actual order of priority required for the distribution of
gg

I1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRupTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES

237-38. Section 7-204 provides:
Stay of Setoff and Use of Property Subject to Right of Setoff.
(a) A petition filed by or against a debtor eligible for relief under
this chapter shall operate as a stay of the setoff of any obligation to
the debtor against any claim owing by the debtor until the stay is
terminated by the bankruptcy court, or the case is dismissed or converted to one under Chapter V or Chapter VI, but such stay shall not
affect the right of the creditor to withhold payment to or on the order
of the debtor, except when otherwise ordered pursuant to subdivision

(c).
(b) Pursuant to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and section
4-501(b) and (c), a creditor may file a complaint (1) to terminate the
stay, or (2) to modify the stay by imposing such conditions as will
adequately protect the creditor. The trustee or debtor shall have the
burden of proving that the person asserting the right of setoff is adequately protected.
(c) The court may order the person asserting the right of setoff
to pay to the trustee or to the debtor if a trustee has not been appointed, the amount of the obligation sought to be offset if the stay is
not terminated pursuant to subdivision (b). However, the court shall
require as a condition of the order that the trustee or debtor furnish
such protection as will adequately protect the person who is asserting
the right of setoff. The turstee or the debtor shall have the burden of
proving that the person asserting the right of setoff is adequately
protected.
Id.
Section 7-204 is applicable to railroad reorganization under section 9-101 of the
Proposed Act. 11
STATES 273.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRurcY LAWS OF THE UNITED

' The passage of proposed section 7-204 will also relieve the conflict between
reorganization and straight bankruptcy created by the Baker decision. That conflict
is grounded in the Baker Court's inattentiveness to the Lowden precedent and the
express provisions for setoff in the Bankruptcy Act. Legislative amendment providing
for a stay of all reorganization setoffs will dissolve the conflict by statutorily countering
the provisions for setoff in straight bankruptcy.
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securities under a reorganization plan. Section 7-310(d)(2)(B) of the
Proposed Act provides in part that the court shall confirm a plan if
there is a reasonable basis for the valuation on which the plan
is based and the plan is fair and equitable in that there is a
reasonable probability that the securities issued and other consideration distributed under the plan will tully compensate the
respective classes of creditors and equity security holders of the
debtor for their respective interests in the debtor or his prop0
erty. '
This language seems to indicate that the only change intended is a
relaxation of the former standard for confirmation requiring exact
compensation for the claims surrendered by the creditors. Such an
interpretation is supported by the Commission's Notes, which state
that the provision is not intended to alter the absolute priority requirement that securities be allocated to higher priority creditors
before junior interests are allowed to participate.' 2 They indicate,
instead, that the modification is intended only to provide for easier
affirmation of a plan due to the switch to the "reasonable probability" requirement.' 3 Since Baker is premised upon the absolute priority requirement, and given the unaltered order of priority under the
Proposed act, it should be concluded that if the new chapter is passed
with the omission of section 7-204 and the inclusion of section 7310(d)(2)(B), the Baker rule will probably be extended to protect
debtors in reorganization under it.
Conclusion
In light of the possible impact of the Supreme Court's decision in
Baker, it may be advanced that the majority paid too little attention
to the different factor precedent established in Lowden and subsequent decisions. The Court's utilization of the absolute priority rule
will probably effect a total preclusion of setoffs in all reorganization
proceedings, thus frustrating traditional business expectations and
precipitating uneconomical precautions on the part of creditors. '
MII
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Moreover, the implementation of the rule appears to create a conflict
between straight bankruptcy and reorganization. On the other hand,
it may be suggested that the result is desirable in light of the rehabilitative purpose of section 77 and the public interest in railroad survival. The preclusion of setoffs, regardless of the underlying rationale
therefore, protects the debtor's operating capital from depletion, thus
helping to preserve an ongoing railroad. These interests, however,
were adequately protected under the traditional cash need test. Indeed, it appears that this test, .with minor modification, could have
produced the same result in Baker.
The amount of the setoff in Baker was relatively small, but the
Court could have concentrated on an aggregated amount of all possible setoffs against the Penn Central. In any case, this approach
should provide a figure sufficient to preclude the application of section 68 under the cash need test.0 5 A minor problem would have
developed, however, since most of the possible setoffs against the
Penn Central had previously been denied by the reorganization court.
Having no account of the remaining amount that might be setoff, the
Court would have had difficulty justifying a denial under the altered
test. It might, however, have emphasized those reorganization court
cases which had denied setoff, and established a case of unique unfairness. Given the equitable nature of setoff,' the Court could easily
have concluded that it would be unfair to allow Gold Seal a setoff
when such action had previously been denied other creditors.,"
If the Court had adopted this approach and had desired to proceed
further, it might have authorized an aggregated amount cash need
test and expressly approved a reorganization court's power to enjoin
setoffs as suggested in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion. The
105The aggregated amount approach contemplates the addition of all setoffs that
might be effected against a corporation in reorganization. The sum of these possible
setoffs should, in most cases, provide a figure, the amount of which if setoff, would
severely diminish the operating capital of a corporation and thus threaten its chance
of rehabilitation. The principle beyind this approach is that it would be unfair to allow
setoff to some creditors at a time when a debtor could afford it, and at another time
to deny setoff to other creditors because the debtor's operating capital would be severely diminished. Thus, the utilization of an aggregated amount approach in applying
the cash need test would provide uniformity throughout reorganization, and avoid the
discrimination opposed by the majority without raising a conflict between straight

bankruptcy and reorganization.

See text accompanying note 7 supra.
a holding would have been consistent with the equitable determination
suggested by the Supreme Court in Lowden. See text accompanying notes 52,57 supra.
In addition, this rationale was utilized in conjunction with the cash need test as a
basis for denying the setoffs sought in In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 339 F. Supp.
"I

117 Such

603, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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combination of these two concepts would grant a reorganization court
the power, at the time a petition for reorganization was approved, to
evaluate the circumstances surrounding setoff and decide whether
section 68 would be applicable within the reorganization process.
Such a procedure would be consistent with the different factor precedent, the test being founded in a purpose peculiar to section 77, and
although in most cases setoff would not be allowed the absolute effect
of the Baker decision would be avoided.
In light of the alternative means for decision, it appears that the
majority's utilization of the absolute priority rule as a basis for the
application of the inconsistency rationale may have been unwise.
Although ihe general rule pronounced in Baker may have a beneficial
effect in its protection of the rehabilitative purpose of section 77 and
the public interest in railroad survival, these interests were adequately protected under the cash need test. Furthermore, the utilization of the absolute priority rule departs unjustifiably from the different factor precedent long observed by courts applying the inconsistency rationale. Although it may be argued that the general rule
protects valid section 77 interests and establishes a uniformity long
overdue in railroad reorganization, the rationale of the Baker decision
disregards long established precedent, and in so doing, creates what
appears to be an unnecessary conflict between straight bankruptcy
and reorganization.
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